This article analyzes and discusses the objectives of the sanctions implemented by the European Union against Russia and Russian countermeasures against EU member states in 
INTRODUCTION

MOTIVES BEHIND THE SANCTIONS: THEORETICAL OPTIONS
The theoretical part of this article discusses the rationality and logic of sanctions in the international arena in the context of the current EU sanctions imposed on Russia.
In theory, sanctions are mainly aimed at changing the behaviour of the target (a tool for coercion), to limit its behaviour (a constraining effect), or to send the target a message (a signalling effect). 3 To some extent, sanctions could be associated with institutional and neo-institutional models of governance as a tool of self-identification and an instrument of meeting public expectations of interest groups. However, it should be noted that for each individual case the aims and motives of sanctions are case-specific, often consisting of both a formal and hidden agenda. Sanctions have been considered as a policy alternative to military force, material gains, and diplomacy, in a situation where "doing nothing" is not an
. Sanctions can be intended to have an independent effect, but they can also be aimed to amplify or slow down already ongoing political processes, be it budget or external trade deficit, military rearmament, etc.
Sanctions as a tool for coercion are targeted to change the behaviour of a target country and to put an end to its undesirable activities. The change in the behaviour of a target country is expected to occur as a result of direct material costs caused to them which in turn could be avoided upon changing the behaviour.
Thus, targets know what to do to satisfy the sanctioning party's requests and are motivated to implement policies demanded by the sanctioning parties to avoid additional costs. 7 They are expected to do it voluntarily without encountering the risk of political suicide or long term stagnation. 8 Still, the change in the target's behaviour is obviously accompanied by the weakening of the political support for its leaders and regime 9 . At the same time, the imposing party must make consolidated reasonable demands that could be satisfied by a target state without making them "lose face". As stipulated by Groves 10 , sanctions must have a "reasonable prospect of success". However, in many cases next to open official demands there exists also a "hidden agenda", consisting of the aims that are not suitable for official framework (change of the current political regime) or are not fully supported by all members of a multilateral coalition. To sum up, the aims of coercive sanctions should be clearly defined, realistic, measurable, and openly communicated to the target country to avoid false expectations and misleading reactions.
This approach follows closely the traditional "more pain, more gain" logic of economic sanctions which suggests that enough pressure should be put on targets to force them to change their behaviour with the aim to strengthen international the target´s capability to act. 12 In contrast to coercive sanctions, constraining sanctions require targets not to do anything, which also refers to the deterring effect of sanctions aimed at avoiding future violations. The sanctioning parties usually make unfeasible requests or do not make specific requests for actions at all 13 .
Sanctions could also be aimed at sending a signal that the target's behaviour is not approved of and will not be tolerated. 14 The signalling element could be targeted to the international community, countries, populations, non-state entities or individuals. As regards sending a signal to the target, the change in its behaviour is expected due to possible reputation costs, the possibility to enhance future gains, or to enjoy the benefits of multilateral diplomacy. 15 A favourable outcome of signalling sanctions would include the projection of a positive image of the sanctioning party to the rest of the world, the strengthening of a global norm and the indication that the crisis has escalated to a higher level of diplomatic confrontation. Signalling sanctions predominantly does not impose a material impact; however, they may have indirect material impact, e.g. in the form of the loss of foreign direct investment in target countries. 16 Thus, sanctions could also be interpreted as an expression of a country's economic and political influence in the global arena, sending signals to the allies about the credibility and global influence of the state imposing sanctions.
As regards sending a signal to the international community or to a domestic audience, sanctions could be interpreted as one of the tools in a "communication 11 Michael Brzoska, supra note 9. war". Seen in this light, sanctions could be aimed at "shaming" and stigmatizing the target state. 17 In this regard, sanctions are imposed to destabilize or to subvert the target country by convincing the international community, markets, investors, and other subjects that the target's behaviour will not be tolerated and may have untoward and unintended consequences. However, as a side effect the "rallyaround-the-flag" phenomenon in the target country could occur in the form of consolidated support to the political leadership and an increased nationalism 18 .
Sanctions could also be imposed to send a signal to the domestic audience, thus confirming a nation's vital interests. 19 For example, the US embargo against Cuba before 1991, intended to isolate Cuba economically, was carried out along lines of national security rationale, since Cuba was considered a threat to American and/or regional security. 20 Sanctions could also be considered a signal to the international community about the credibility and economic and political influence of the sanctioning party in the global arena.
In addition to this, sanctions can be explained with institutional and neoinstitutional theories of governance. In an institutional environment decisionmaking is dominated by habits, procedures, norms and compromises that prefer expectable, rational, continuing, regulated and less risky choices. Rules and norms tend to be dominant over idealist goals and broader gains. 21 The neo-institutional model approaches political processes as regards their appropriateness, i.e. whether they follow the rules and habits, and whether they represent a rational choice among morally acceptable options. Administrative and legal motives are dominant over economic and political ones, and small administrative solutions guide bigger political choices, not vice versa. 22 Bearing in mind that both multilateral and bilateral sanctions have been increasingly used in the international arena since the 1990s and that sanctions have become "a standard reaction to crisis" 23 , sanctions could be interpreted as a "safe" solution, something that "has to be done" in case somebody is violating universally accepted norms. Measures imposed for declarative purposes to show that "in principle, we are able to do it and we might consider other measures if the situation does not change" are unlikely to succeed in forcing the target country to change its behaviour. First, as suggested in the secondary literature, sanction threats are more effective when used against democracies than non-democracies, whereas democracies are also less sensitive to promises of reward than non-democracies.
Thus, democracies need to be punished, whereas autocracies should be rewarded. 24 However, Lektzian and Souva 25 argue that autocracies are more likely to concede to sanctions than democracies. Among the former, personalist regimes and monarchies are more sensitive to the loss of external sources of revenue and are, therefore, more likely to be destabilized by sanctions, whereas dominant singleparty and military regimes will be less sensitive to the loss of external resources, as they will be able to increase their tax revenues and reallocate their expenditures. 26 Similarly, democracies employ sanctions more than other regime types, because they pursue human rights and democratization goals with economic sanctions as well as encompass a great variety of interest groups, affecting the incentives of the leaders. 27 Secondly, sanctions cause behavioural change after being imposed, if the target country has initially underestimated the impact of sanctions, miscalculated the sanctioning country's determination to impose them, or wrongly believed that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not, and if the target's misperceptions are corrected after sanctions are imposed. 28 Thirdly, different types of sanctions have different effects. 29 In principle, trade sanctions have proved to be rather inefficient, as in a globalised world the substitute sources of supply could be easily found in the majority of cases. In theory, as suggested by Tostensen 
IMPOSED SANCTIONS, COUNTERMEASURES, AND EXPECTED
RESULTS
The economic and political sanctions and the countermeasures taken represent an important component of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, from which both sides expect to become an efficient tool to put pressure on another conflicting party, as well as to send a strong signal to the international community and to their own citizens. however no indications were given about which conditions need to be fulfilled to end the sanctions or how to be removed from the list.
As a countermeasure, on August 6, 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a decree "on the use of specific economic measures", which mandated an effective embargo for a one-year period on imports of most of the agricultural products "whose country of origin had either adopted the decision on introduction of economic sanctions in respect of Russian legal and (or) physical entities, or joined same". The Russian government ordinance was adopted and published with immediate effect, which specified the banned items as well as the countries of provenance: the member states of the European Union, but also the United States, once again described in more precision, but also first specific conditions for lifting and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia. 60 While the reasons and tools of sanctions have been described in depth, the expected outcome and policy change has only been covered in very general terms. At first sight the traditional "more pain, more gain" does not seem to be at stake in the present case.
In case of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, politicians have stipulated that the purpose of the EU sanctions "is not to punish Russia, but to make clear that it must cease its support for the separatists and stop destabilizing Ukraine" 63 and that "acceptance of the status quo does not belong among the topics for discussion" 64 .
Thus, hereby the EU admits that sanctions should not be imposed with the aim to cause economic harm, but to send a signal to the target country -and probably also to the potential investors -that actions targeted to harm the territorial integrity of Ukraine are not tolerated. Hereby, one could draw a conclusion, that it is only indirectly relevant how much Russia will be actually punished because of the sanctions, as it determines the scale of the pressure to Russia to change its behaviour, but is not an aim in itself. Thus, in the case of the EU it is more about the "signalling effect", which should be evaluated when discussing the effectiveness of the sanctions than the economic impact. At the same time, the Russian countermeasures against EU countries and their partners were primarily designed to "punish" the EU and its partners, as the argument of "if we are restricted then we'll have to respond" was used. 
CAN THE PRESENT SANCTIONS SUCCEED IN LIGHT OF POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS?
Previous experience of the EU over the past twenty years, including approximately thirty cases, shows that none of them could be regarded as a What must also be taken into account, particularly after the first round of sanctions in March 2014 the international community, was the potential negative impact of sanctions on the Russian economy. This is probably because the economic "harm" is often the only visible short-term indicator of success or failure of sanctions imposed and thus it is possible to speculate that the international community expected major political changes to occur in Russia during a relatively short period after imposing sanctions. In the absence of political success, the for Russia to simultaneously satisfy the European Union's requests to withdraw its troops and equipment from the area and not to lose face both on the international and national stages. Therefore, although fully justified in theory, in real terms the EU's request that Russia should cease its support for the separatists in East Ukraine had no reasonable prospect of success. Secondly, another precondition for the coercive element of sanctions to work is that sanctions cause direct material costs to targets, something that could be avoided when changing the behaviour.
However, as discussed earlier, the economic harm has not been declared as the main aim of the EU-sanctions; on the contrary, it was hardly mentioned when implementing the sanctions.
Conversely, a lot was expected from the signalling element of the sanctions. The signalling effect of the sanctions has been mitigated by the fact that the opinions of the EU member states̕ on the issue have diverged considerably.
According to Leenders, 74 it is difficult to impose EU-sanctions against non-EU countries due to the insufficient solidarity in the EU which combines with the divergent individual interests of the member states, the tensions between "realist" In addition, the international stigmatization of Russia's actions also has not worked. Russia has sent a signal to the international community that Russia does ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 8, NUMBER 1 2015
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not acknowledge the obvious violation of the fundamental principles of international law, and that the country is ready to combat "unfair" measures against Russia, whatever the costs. However, knowing that its federal budget is highly dependent on oil revenues, the avoidance of using the "transit card" could be, to some extent, interpreted as a sign that Russia is still not determined to win the current "sanctions game" at any cost. In general, the international community is also rather sceptical as regards Russia's willingness to block oil transit through Ukraine as Russia did not block oil export in the early 1980s, when the Cold War was at its height.
In practice, the economic as well as political pressure on Russia has occurred during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as a result of a combination of the reaction of international financial and capital markets, domestic inflationary pressure and overall macroeconomic imbalances (mainly the overall fall in oil prices). From
October to December 2014, the Russian rouble weakened remarkably, direct investments to Russia decreased and capital continued to flee Russia.
At the same time, the weaker rouble has provided protection for the federal budget (i.e. export earnings and taxes paid on exports will be translated into a larger sum of roubles, thereby boosting the country's budget revenues) and created indirect stimulus to domestic producers (imported products are relatively more expensive while domestic goods become more price-competitive). About two-thirds of government revenue comes from taxes on oil, gas, and other dollar-denominated exports. Because government expenditure is in roubles, a stronger rouble would exacerbate the government's deficit and add further tension to an already painful political process. 81 To avoid the growing risk of hyperinflation, the Russian Central Bank has also spent remarkable amounts of reserves since the beginning of 2015, and has so far succeeded in stabilizing the exchange rate.
Assuming that a regime change could occur only due to a growing dissatisfaction among Russian citizens, in reality and despite the economic difficulties, regime change in Russia is still rather unlikely because a strong Both crucial elements for successful sanctions-a clear, achievable aim and sufficient economic and political pain-are missing: Russian oil and gas are still flowing to the markets and Putin himself is not only in power but more popular than ever before and, curiously, also without any travel restrictions. This could hardly be considered sufficient in motivating Russia to change its behaviour. There is also hardly any reason to believe that the short-term pressure on Russia should amount to any serious coercive and constraining effect while sticking to the current set of sanctions.
Along these lines, the question remains whether the sanctions against Russia could contribute to the resolution of the military conflicts in Ukraine within a sufficient timeframe to save Ukrainian economic and political stability. Drawing on the available historical parallels, the sanctions imposed to alter military activities and to force the target country to withdraw its troops from border skirmishes have in general not been successful.
In the particular case under discussion, i.e. during the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, it is unlikely that the sanctions against Russia could force it to change its behaviour in active way (by returning Crimea). The maximum that can be expected is to discourage Russia from further aggressive actions against other former Soviet republics. As argued above, this is because the aims of sanctions were unclear in the beginning and also a relatively weak "tool-box" of sanctions has been used by 
